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Impact of Sanctions on the Level of
Citizens’ Political Confidence in the Power
in Russia: the Incentive Role of the Media
IVAN V. RADIKOV
St. Petersburg State University, Russian Federation
The study is based on the provision that citizens’ confidence in power determines
the stability of the political and social system and is a prerequisite for the
development of the country. One of the objects of sanctions pressure on Russia
is the interaction of the state and civil society. The purpose of the study is to
identify the effectiveness of the influence of Western sanctions on the level of
political confidence of citizens in the Russian power, as well as to establish the
incentive role of the media in this process. The direct and indirect, immediate,
and the cumulative effect of sanctions causes both emotional and rational attitude
of citizens to them and has positive and negative effects. The article concludes
that under modern conditions, sanctions are more likely to strengthen than weaken
the power; moreover, they strengthen the confrontational worldview in society.
However, the cumulative nature of the impact of sanctions, coupled with a
deterioration in the lives of Russians and the accumulation of their egocentrism,
reduces the level of political confidence in the power and increases the risks of a
social explosion directed against the course of the reigning political elite.
Keywords: Media, political confidence, sanctions policy, interaction between
the state and citizens.
The use of sanctions as a way of external non-military economic pressure often causes the
desired results, but the deep goals of the sanctions’ impact are political, and only in
exceptional cases it turned to be successful. The political overarching goal of anti-Russian
sanctions has always been to discredit and isolate the country’s political leadership,
change the political system and regime, and radically change the state’s political course in
all key areas. The intensity of this pressure in different periods of the development of the
Russian state used to change, but its political goal, in essence, remained unchanged. The
constant, as a rule, implicit was the vector of the impact of anti-Russian sanctions on the
population. Since the relations with civil society ultimately are strategic in terms of public
policy, the monitoring of the dangers for these relations and efficient response to them
becomes the most important task for power. A kind of indicator of this interaction is the
citizens’ confidence in power. In turn, sanctions can play the incentive role for non-
confidence / confidence of citizens in power. The media play an important role in shaping
the attitude of the population towards sanctions.
A feature of the current stage of development of Russia is that some of the people
treating the state with increasing non-confidence, and sometimes hostility, are embraced
by anxiety about its activities and hidden fear of the actions of individual executive
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structures. One more distinguishing feature should be noted: “in the political discourse of
the 21st century, a clear manifestation of society’s indifference to conventional public
politics and an obvious deviation from conventional forms of political participation are
observed” (Mayr, 2019, p. 27). At the same time, it is the interaction of the state and civil
society that determines the conditions for the successful development of the country, its
sustainable development (Èepenaite & Kavaliunaite, 2013; Tvaronavièiene, 2018; Veebel &
Markus, 2016; Chernova et al., 2017). Therefore, the impact of economic sanctions on the
social sphere, a decrease in the quality of life of people can reduce the strength of this
interaction. Hence the hypothesis of the study: if the socio-economic policy pursued in the
country does not meet the expectations of the majority of the population, then the sanctioning
effect on the dynamics of citizens’ confidence in political power becomes significant. In turn,
an economically and socially effective state, coupled with a constructive dialogue between
the authorities and society, creates a high margin of safety and minimizes the degree of
influence of sanctions on the level of political confidence of citizens in power. Depending
on the ideological orientation, the media can arouse non-confidence in power, or reduce it,
to influence the cultural and worldview position of society (Yessenbekova, 2015, 2016).
Having defined the subject of this article as the influence of modern sanctions
on the level of political confidence of citizens in power in Russia, and the goal as the
identification of the degree of its effectiveness, the authors set the following research
objectives:
(i) the consideration of the political consequences of the economic sanctions
employment;
(ii) the identification of the factors contributing to confidence / non-confidence in
the institutions of power;
(iii) the identification of national characteristics of perception and counteraction to
external pressures.
In modern literature, there are no special studies of the impact of sanctions on
relations between the power and society, and in particular on the dynamics of citizens’
confidence in political power. The study of the mechanism of such influence and the role of
the media in these processes under the conditions of the sanctions regime in a specific
country (for example, Russia) may be of scientific interest.
Literature Review
Despite the prevalence of sanctions as an instrument of policy implementation in the 21st
century and a significant amount of academic literature describing them, their essential
characteristics lack a single point of view on the reasons of employment, the problem of
legitimacy and effectiveness. In theoretical and methodological terms, most modern research
is based on the work of G. Houghbauer, J. Schott, C. Eliot, and B. Oeg (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p.
13). The term “sanctions” is construed by them as the deliberate actions of the state (the
initiating country), a coalition of countries or international organizations aimed at reduction,
restriction or termination of the customs, trade or financial relations with the “target country”
or “destination country.” It is estimated that only in the 20th-century sanctions were applied
174 times (USA-109, Great Britain-16, EU-14, USSR and RF-13, UN-20 times) (Hufbauer et al.,
2009, p. 5). The objectives of these enforcement actions were classified as follows: moderate
impact on the policy of the “opponent” (43 cases); regime change under the guise of
“democratization” (80); the cessation of hostilities (19), the destruction of military potential
(29), other significant changes in the political sphere (33) (Hufbauer et al., 2009, p. 17).
577
A few more notable publications should be noted. Thus, analyzing the impact of
sanctions on the Russian economy, E. Ashford (Ashford, 2016) defines the strategy of their
employment as “not very smart” and notes, that unlike small states, economic anti-Russian
sanctions are unable to achieve their goal. She emphasizes that the sanctions turned to be
insufficient for the political elite, since the political regime protects its associates, shifting
the burden of sanctions to everyone else. It is difficult, however, to agree with the author’s
conclusion about the unforeseen consequences of the sanctions, which created difficulties
for ordinary Russians. In this regard, E. Ashford rightly notes that sanctions create the
effect of consolidating power, uniting Russians under the national flag because they blame
the West for all their troubles.
The authoritarian nature of the political regime and its anti-Western propaganda,
which governs the public perception of the nature of sanctions, are noted by Swedish
researchers S. Oksenshtern and P. Olsen (Oxenstierna & Olsson, 2015). Based on case
studies of sanctions against South Africa, Libya, and Iraq, they show that it takes a long
time to achieve political goals.
Considering the perspectives of the sanctions against Russia, P. Harell, T. Kittinezh,
S. Lane, and E. Rosenberg (Harrell et al., 2017), recognize that the strategic problems of
foreign policy that underlie the employment of sanctions are long-standing. The researchers
state that holding back the investments, the sanctions contribute to slowing down Russian
economic growth. Of particular interest is the book by N. Gould-Davis (Nigel Gould-Davies
Economic Effects and Political Impacts: Assessing Western Sanctions on Russia, 2018),
which is focused on the economic effects, political impact and assessment of Western
sanctions applied to Russia. First, his description of the possible objectives of the sanctions
should be noted: (i) to determine future behavior, to prevent unacceptable actions, to
restrain punishment; (ii) to change past actions, i.e., to form an attitude towards them; (iii)
to change the regime, not only the politics but also the political power; (iv) to condemn
certain violations of international law. Secondly, his notion that the sanctions against a
democratic regime are more effective than the sanctions against the authoritarian regime
should be noted. Thirdly, his discussions about the dependence of the effectiveness of the
sanctions on the time of employment, support of the international community, the reality
of the geopolitical isolation of the object of sanctions, should be noted.
The above academic works confirm that the research efforts of the scientists are
mainly focused on the analysis of the effectiveness of anti-Russian sanctions in the field of
economics, finance, and new technologies. There are practically no specialized academic
works studying the intentional effect of sanctions on citizens’ confidence in the power,
although they are sometimes relevant. For example, T. Fry (Frei, 2017) proposes to
overestimate the economic sanctions impact theory. Analyzing the policy of anti-Russian
sanctions, he concludes that they do not directly affect citizens’ loyalty to government
policy, but they can weaken the degree of economic activity of the population in support of
the government. J. Dresen argues in the same vein (Dresen, 2015), stating that even narrowly
targeted sanctions make it possible to obtain a “cohesion effect.”
Russian science has its methodology for assessing the impact of sanctions on
the economy. For example, S. Glazyev and V. Arkhipova (Glazyev & Arkhipova, 2018) propose
to evaluate the effectiveness of the sanctions based on the dynamics of GDP, as well as on
factors of crisis impact on the economy, on the change in the indicators of individual fields
of activity for a given time. However, like Western researchers, they do not study the
mechanism of the influence of sanctions on the interaction of the state and citizens. The
authors emphasize that the impact of sanctions cannot be accurately measured, and the
consequences of sanctions are dependent on economic policies.
Radikov
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The monograph edited by N. Nureyev (Nureyev, 2017, p. 52) describes the
consequences of economic sanctions for Russia and Western countries. There is also no
analysis of the impact of sanctions on citizens’ confidence in political institutions, but the
conclusions that sanctions have contributed to the growth of polarization of big capital
and the bureaucracy affiliated with it, as well as the fact that the burden of economic anti-
Russian sanctions for ordinary consumers affects the change in prices for goods, are
worth noting (Nureyev, 2017, p. 72).
Noting the interest of the Russian media in the problem of sanctions and recording
the fact that only in the period from March to December 2014, 92155 articles on this topic
have been published in the central and regional media, which made this problem one of
the most popular (for comparison: 54964 publications were devoted to the 22nd Olympic
Games in Sochi). The researcher A. Kazun (2016, p. 258) analyzes the main strategies for
the de-problematization of the economic sanctions and concludes that one of the possible
reasons for the ineffectiveness of the sanctions is to switch the public discussion from
analysis of the consequences to a discussion of current problems. One can agree with this
conclusion since, in the situation of economic sanctions, a decrease in freedom is noted.
Moreover, the public discussion may experience the influence of interest groups. Let us note
the differing interest in sanctions among Russian social groups. While a business-oriented
newspaper Kommersant published 1574 articles during the indicated period, 945 articles
were published in the official and governmental newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 258 articles
– in the weekly newspapers Argumenty i Fakty and 396 articles were published in Novaya
Gazeta, reflecting the interests of the non-systemic opposition (Kazun, 2016, p. 256).
As a generalized conclusion, the authors note that due to the lack of a generally
accepted model for the analysis of the impact of sanctions on citizens’ confidence in the
power, the above-mentioned works can be used as a methodological guideline to achieve
the goals of this study.
Methodology
The analysis of the impact of sanctions on the level of political confidence of citizens in the
Russian power is carried out herein in the historical, legal, comparative, and socio-
economic aspects. The authors proceed from the fact that confidence cannot be accurately
measured and can be estimated by indirect indicators: the attitude of citizens towards
political institutions and leaders, the political course; the electoral activity; the
participation in the protest movement. The study is based on the statement of P. Shtompka
(Shtompka, 2012, p. 369) that the acquisition of the citizens’ confidence “is of value to the
rulers, just because it immeasurably reduces the managerial costs.
The work is based on the following methodologically important characteristics
of confidence as a property of politics and as a form of ontological security:
firstly, F. Tennis’s statement that “at the heart of balance, our sense of security
is the confidence in the regular and reliable, although very different functioning of the
three large systems of social will, called order, law and morality” (Tennis, 1998, p. 211);
secondly, the idea of   E. Giddens, that “confidence in systems takes the form of
impersonal obligations in which faith is maintained through the functioning of knowledge
in which a simple person, as a rule, understands nothing” (Giddens, 2011, p. 217);
thirdly, S. Ringen’s conclusion that “the power provides in the best and rare
case only control over the “others” who do not want to obey, but it is not able to lead them
to voluntary cooperation with the government” (Ringen, 2016, p. 114);
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fourthly, the provision of N. Luman, who defined confidence as a mechanism
for minimizing the risks and as a certain sociocultural resource that contributes to the
realization of the potential of an action (Ringen, 2016, pp. 183-184).
The author’s model for the analysis of the impact of sanctions at the level of
citizens’ political confidence in the power in Russia is based on a systematic approach
and proceeds from the possibilities of direct and indirect (indirect) effect of sanctions. The
authors emphasize that the term “sanctions” herein means the activities aimed at restriction
or influence the sovereignty and sovereign political course of Russia through economic
measures, the attempts to destabilize the political system aimed at changing the political
course of the state, political regime, fundamentals or individual components of domestic
and foreign policy.
The model involves the consideration of the actually measurable consequences
of economic sanctions employment: the decrease in real incomes of the population as a
result of a sharp slowdown in all economic processes; the decrease in investment; the
decline in revenues to the state budget; the growth of the black market, corruption, illegal
business, inflation. The actions of a non-systemic opposition are regarded as a possible
catalyst for civil discontent with the authorities. The media play an incentive role here.
Depending on the ideological orientation, they can both arouse non-confidence in power
and to scuttle it. The criteria for determining citizens’ confidence in the power are the
sociological data of polls published in Russia that establish attitudes to political
institutions, government bodies, and political leaders, taking into account possible costs
of sanctions employed.
Results and Discussion
The level of interaction between the state and citizens is largely determined by the decline
in the prestige of the state that occurred in the Russian public consciousness at the end of
the 20th-beginning of the 21st century. The ideas about the state change together with the
logic of the relationship between the citizens and the power. The state is increasingly
perceived by people as “a special, fairly sustainable political unit, representing an
organization of power and administration separated from the population and claiming
the supreme right to govern certain territories and populations, regardless of the consent
of the latter” (Grinin, 1997, p. 20). The contents of cooperation between the citizens and the
state in Russia it is implicitly defined by the genetically determined fear of the citizens
before the government, the possible dangerous consequences of its decisions. These
anxieties are not only related “to economic problems, despite they are superficial, but
rather to a feeling of estrangement of the power from society, its injustice and self-interest,
lack of moral basis” (Shestopal, 2011, p. 22-23). At the same time, the state itself, the ruling
elite almost always experience an implicit fear of the population. As a rule, they proceed
from the assumption that “the government has enemies who not only do not want to obey
but oppose a social agreement. These people are dangerous, and disobedience is
contagious” (Ringen, 2016, p. 272). Thus, the authors consider interaction as a two-way
process that requires not only a citizen but also a state.
Let us outline the specifics of the sanctions applied against modern Russia. If
during the Soviet period of state development, the main object of the Western sanctions
policy was mainly the economic sphere, the goal was to inflict maximum economic damage,
and the main directions were focused on the restriction of the natural resources exports
and imports, then in the Russian period, the object of sanctions and their content are
expanding. Currently, they affect not only the economic and financial spheres but also they
Radikov
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are directed against individual representatives of the Russian establishment and the
military-political leadership. Moreover, they are also transferred today to the sphere of
culture and the field of humanitarian cooperation.
The Western sanctions in 2014-2018 covered a fifth of Russia’s GDP, 54% of the
assets of the banking sector, 95% of the revenues of oil and gas companies and almost all
defense industry enterprises. The sanctions annually result in the loss of one and a half
percent of GDP growth by Russia (ÀKRÀ: Western Sanctions Have Affected 20-21% of Russian
GDP, 2018). At the same time, the sanctions did not become the main constraining factor for
the growth of the Russian economy. They did not create a crisis in Russia but reinforced the
negative trends of the protracted process of transformation of the Russian economic model.
Assessing the results of the impact of the sanctions policy on Russia, first of all,
the authors note that the awareness of the Russian population about the sanctions’ impact
of the United States and Western countries is mainly based on media reports and speeches
of political leaders. Therefore, the employment of anti-Russian sanctions is perceived
differently in the public mind. In a negative context, it is regarded as an aggressive act
against the Russian state, as an act of political and economic pressure from the USA and
European states. As a positive factor, it qualifies as an incentive for the development of the
national economy; promotes the rise of patriotic moods; pushes the country to develop its
technologies; reduces the dependence on international economic relations.
In turn, the attitude of the Russian population to sanctions is not constant. It is
dynamic and complex. Three substantive states can be distinguished: (i) an emotional
attitude that defines polar positions: one, mainly characterized by the feelings of anxiety
and fear of the scale of the sanctions policy, and the other, on the contrary, ultra-patriotic,
which does not allow any surrender in principle; (ii) indifference, negligence, explained by
mentality, poor information and a certain distance from politics; and (iii) rational attitude,
suggesting the search for alternative solutions in development.
Sociological studies show that in March 2014, the fact of the imposition of
sanctions against Russia aroused concern among 53% of the country’s residents (Russians
on the Sanctions Employed by the United States and the European Union, 2014). This was
facilitated by negative assessments of these discriminatory actions in the Russian media.
However, by the end of 2014, the tone of the media had changed: a statement about
the insignificant impact of the sanctions on the life of Russians became a common refrain.
Moreover, the media, reflecting the position of the power, began to promote their positive
significance: the possibility of turning towards the development of domestic production,
the reduction of the economy’s dependence on oil, imported technology, and goods. A
growing awareness is observed in the public mind that the actual reason for the sanctions
attacks against Russia is not specific actions (Crimea, Donbass, Syria), but the hostile
attitude of the West towards the sovereign position of the Russian state, which openly
opposed the hegemonic aspirations and claims for US world domination.
The result is the adaptation to the sanctions, a decrease in the sense of concern
and anxiety among the citizens of the country: in 2015 their number dropped to 41%, in
2016 – to 39%, and in 2017 – to 28% (Attitude Towards Countries and Sanctions, 2018). But
by the end of 2018, the situation has changed. According to the Levada Center, in November
2018 the threat of sanctions and their employment caused concern among 43% of the
population (Attitude Towards Countries and Sanctions, 2018). The reason for this change
in social mood seems to be not only the low standard of living of a significant number of
Russians but the expansion of access to alternative information. Hence, there is a gradual
loss of confidence in the political course of the state, exacerbated by the costs in the
domestic policy of the state, minimizing the degree of support for the population.
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It should be recognized that the sanctions affect the population indirectly, holding
back the pace of economic growth and thereby hindering the growth of real incomes of the
population. According to the Federal State Statistics Service of Russian (Rosstat, 2019), the
real incomes of Russians have been falling for five consecutive years since 2014, which
coincides with the time of employment of anti-Russian sanctions. The last time real incomes
of the population grew in 2013 by 4%. In 2019, Rosstat reported that 59.2% of young
families and 57.9% of non-working pensioners could not afford durable goods; about 15%
of families noted that their income is enough only to buy food. According to Rosstat, the
poverty level in the first quarter of 2019 increased to 14.3% compared to 13.9% for the
same period last year. Due to the decline in real products and rising food prices, 20.9
million Russians turned to be below the poverty line (More Than 14% of the Population
Lives in “Absolute Poverty” in Russia, 2019). The inability of the power to solve the problem
of poverty in the country over a significant number of years, of course, causes a negative
attitude both to the political course and to representatives of the power.
Thus, it can be noted that the main source of tension in modern Russian society is
the unresolved social and economic problems, insufficient protection of social rights of
citizens, low living standards and poverty of a significant part of the country’s population.
The presence of these problems is exacerbated by the natural fatigue of the citizens from
the inconsistency and incompleteness of reforms in Russia, from the arbitrariness of
power, dishonesty and the facts of unpunished plunder of public wealth, violations of
justice. Together with these circumstances, an unprecedented anti-Russian sanction
pressure increases the risks of a social crisis. But as V. Zorkin accurately noted, the inherent
in Russians “collectivism, formed by harsh nature, countless defensive wars, the need to
unite many nations and nationalities with a common destiny on their land,” confronts the
sanction pressure (Hufbauer et al., 2009, pp. 1, 5).
According to various international agencies, the confidence of Russian citizens in
political power is decreasing year by year. For example, an independent company Edelman
in 2018, through an online survey in 27 countries, found that the Russians trust in public
institutions least of all in the world. If the global confidence index in the world has grown
by three points (from 45 to 49), in Russia the level of confidence in the power, media, NPOs
and business has decreased by 7 points (from 36 to 29) (Confidence Rating for Public
Institutions in the Countries of the World, 2019).
In modern conditions, the sociological studies carried out in Russia by different
groups show inconsistent results and, it seems that they often do not reflect objective
reality, and the use of their results can play a provocative role as a catalyst for social
protest. For example, the data of the sociological poll performed by the All-Russian Public
Opinion Research Center show that, despite the difficulties experienced, more than 50% of
citizens are satisfied, to one degree or another, with the internal policies of the power,
carried out under the conditions of the sanctions regime.
Options 2Q 2008 4Q 2014 4Q 2015 4Q 2016 4Q 2017 4Q 2018 2Q 2019
Generally satisfied 32 48 53 48 43 28 26
Partly satisfied / 47 36 29 30 33 34 33
Partly unsatisfied
Generally unsatisfied 16 3 15 18 21 35 35
Difficult to answer 4 4 3 4 3 3 6
Source: (Assessment of the Power, 2017).
Table 1. The attitude of the citizens to the domestic policy of the current power (%)
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The research team under the supervision of S. Belanovsky, claims based on the
results of its surveys, that the consciousness of the inhabitants of the regions of Russia
has changed not in favor of the power. The sociologists of this group make a radical
challenge: “people want only one thing – to change the power.” (Sociologists: Russians Are
Ready to Change Power Through Revolution, 2019).
For the opposition political forces opposing themselves to legitimate authorities,
the anti-Russian sanctions policy, creating maximum problems for the state, become one
of the real ways to weaken it. The paradoxical political effect in the opposition’s activity is
that in modern conditions, sanctions weaken not the power, but the opposition, supporting
the sanctions policy against Russia. This is due to the Russian nature, its national rebellious
spirit. With the emergence of an external threat, sanctions lead not only to the unity of the
people but also to the consolidation of the political system and society. Firstly, that there
is a certain layer of society that unconditionally supports the leaders of the opposition
forces. Secondly, that if the situation in the social sphere worsens significantly, and the
distance between the government and the people does not decrease, then the populist
rhetoric of unsystematic opposition may well find more and more supporters. The opposition
of a different kind may appear inside the ruling class. The sanction policy against specific
representatives of the political elite, family members, their assets may cause
disappointment for some of its representatives in the chosen political course and ideals of
the ruling elite.
The choice as the main object of the informational impact of young Russians who
grew up in the Internet era, an attempt to present them as the main driver of destructive
political processes also does not give the results expected in the West. The experts of the
Russian Public Opinion Research Center have published the results of their study of social
moods in Russian society: 58% of citizens aged 18 to 24 are happy with their life, 55% – in
the age group of 25-34, 42% of respondents aged 18-24 expect future improvements (Data
of a Study of the Social Mood of Modern Russian Youth, 2019).
The sanctions regime puts forward specific requirements for the mechanism of the
political ruling, and especially for the political leader. Self-confidence, neglect of others,
arrogance, optionality, inconsistency, and dishonesty destroy the confidence in a political
leader. According to the Levada Center, the proportion of Russians who believe that officials
lie about the state of affairs in the country reached 52% in 2018, compared with 37% of the
previous year. Only 12% believe in the veracity of bureaucrats versus 20% (More Than Half
of Russians Accuse Officials of Lying About the Situation in the Country, 2018). Considering
that the political elite is one of the objects of sanctions, the authors present the data on
confidence / non-confidence in the most famous Russian politicians (Table 2).
Politician Confidence Non-confidence
20.05. 23.09. 20.01. 19.05. 20.05. 23.09. 20.01. 19.05.
2018 2018 2019 2019 2018 2018 2019 2019
V.V. Putin 47.4 37.2 32.8 31.7 2.3 5.8 7.5 6.6
S.V. Lavrov 20.8 16.1 13.4 14.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
D.A. Medvedev 16.6 11.2 13.1 13 17.9 27 25.7 23.4
S.K. Shoigou 9.1 9.5 9.5 8.8 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7
V.V. Zhirinovsky 12.5 7.3 7.8 7.6 33.2 28.6 24.6 22.9
G.A. Zjuganov 4.9 7.3 5.8 5.5 12.2 12.5 10.6 10
A. Navalniy 0.8 1 1.2 1.5 2.5 2.2 1.5 2.1
Source: (Confidence in Politicians. Ratings and Indices, 2019)
Table 2. Dynamics of assessments of confidence / non-confidence in Russian politicians (%)
583
The greatest confidence is still enjoyed by V.V. Putin. The authors acknowledge that
if the president’s rating exceeded 40% until 2017, then starting in 2018, it fell to 32%. In
accordance with the amended calculation method introduced by the Russian Public Opinion
Research Center on May 2019, Putin’s rating again exceeds 70%. Let us emphasize the
extremely low level of confidence of Russians in the opposition. The growth of the critical
attitude of the population towards the power and, directly to the president, is connected
with the government’s failure to fulfill its promise to restore the order in the country,
disregard to justice, and disappointment in the government’s activities. P. Mayr ’s
assumption that “love or dislike of politicians, confidence or non-confidence in them,
were a much less important problem than the impact they had on the real-life of citizens”
is confirmed (Mayr, 2019, p. 21). Dissatisfied people are aggravated, firstly, by a frank
demonstration of the growth of wealth of the officials at all levels, and, secondly, by the
governmental decisions on the priority assistance to Russian businessmen who have been
sanctioned in the face of not decreasing the level of poverty in the country.
Conclusion
The results of the study led to the following conclusions:
The interaction of the state and citizens is the object of the strategy of the sanctions policy
of Western countries against modern Russia. A kind of indicator of the interaction between
the state and the citizen is the trust of citizens in the power.
The sanctions employed against Russia are considered as a threat to the Russian state and
society and are morally unacceptable to Russian society. Anti-Russian sanctions set a
significant number of Russians against the West.
Sanctions affect the population indirectly, holding back the pace of economic growth and
thereby hindering the growth of real incomes of the population. The socio-economic policy
pursued in the country, despite the existing problems, is supported by the majority of the
population, the sanctions’ effect on the dynamics of citizens’ confidence in political power
in these conditions is not significant. At the same time, the sanctions strengthen the existing
negative trends in the country and lead to a worsening of the economic situation, respectively,
they reduce real well-being, deepen social differentiation, intensify lobbying pressure on
the power, and provoke political instability. The dissatisfaction of the citizens is gradually
accumulating.
The media influence the formation of the attitude of Russians towards the employment of
sanctions. The latter are perceived in the public mind both in a negative and in a positive
context; the attitude of the Russian population towards sanctions is dynamic.
Acknowledgement: The study is carried out in the framework of the Grant for Scientific
Research at the expense of Saint Petersburg State University HUM_2018-2019 “Economic
sanctions against Russia: impact assessment, strategy, and countermeasures policy.”
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